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THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LIBERTARIANISM
Randy E. Barnett  *
While the classical liberal political philosophy that emphasizes individual
liberty is centuries old, the modern American variant known as “libertarianism”
can be traced to the early 1960s.  The story has been told before,  but I trace the1
modern libertarian intellectual movement to the split between Ayn Rand and
Murray Rothbard.  Rand had popularized the centrality of liberty as defined by
property rights and grounded in an Aristotelian version of natural law.  Rothbard,
an economist, further developed these elements while emphasizing the role of
Austrian economics in explaining how liberty and the free market operate.
Significantly, Rothbard also adopted an anarchist stance towards monopolistic
government.  While none of the component parts of Rothbardianism were entirely
original, it is fair to say that his distinctive combination of Austrian economics,
Aristotelian natural law ethics, Lockean natural rights, noninterventionist foreign
policy, and individualist anarchism comprised a distinctive package that captured
the imagination of a cadre of young intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, many of
whom went on to become influential in their own right in the 1980s and 1990s.
Rothbard shared another, less attractive, quality of Rand’s that would
prove historically significant: his insistence on complete ideological purity.  Most
who entered his orbit in the 1970s were independent thinkers—or they would not
have escaped the dominant statist orthodoxy of their schooling—yet their very
independence eventually put them at odds with Rothbardian orthodoxy.  Almost
every intellectual who entered his orbit was eventually spun off, or self-
emancipated, for some deviation or another.  For this reason, the circle around
Rothbard was always small, stunting and obscuring what should have been his
intellectual legacy. 
In a similar vein, Rothbard was also jealous of any competition for the
hearts and minds of libertarians.  The principal objects of his ire in this regard,
and that of his intellectual circle, were Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.
Friedman not only held a prestigious academic appointment at the University of
Chicago, in contrast with Rothbard’s position at Brooklyn Polytechnic, he also
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achieved national prominence with his regular column in Newsweek magazine.
Rothbardians strongly criticized the “utilitarianism” of Friedman’s defense of
liberty, as well as his willingness to offer government programs, such as school
vouchers and the negative income tax, that compromised with, rather than
opposed outright, statism.  Friedman’s embrace of “neoclassical” economics,
rather than Austrianism, was another object of severe criticism.
As a pioneer of Austrian economics, Hayek was obviously on stronger
methodological grounds than Friedman, though Hayek rejected the strict
praxiological methodology of his and Rothbard’s teacher, Ludwig von Mises, an
approach that stressed the role of deduction from axiomatic first principles of
economics.   If anything, Hayek was much less ideologically libertarian in his2
policy prescriptions for most of his career than even Friedman.   Hayek never
warmed to the concept of natural rights, which he associated with “French”
rationalism.  Given Rothbard’s professional insecurity, Hayek’s positions at the
London School of Economics and then at the Committee on Social Thought at the
University of Chicago were not a plus.  Mises himself, of course, was neither a
natural rights adherent nor a radical libertarian, but he did labor in obscurity as an
academic–obtaining only a business school appointment—a disgraceful treatment
with which his protege Rothbard could strongly identify.
I relate this story with no desire to deprecate the memory of Murray
Rothbard.  Few thinkers had as much influence on my intellectual development
than he.  Beginning with his writings when I was in college, especially For a New
Liberty,  and continuing with our personal association throughout law school, I3
came to internalize the Rothbardian paradigm and to a large extent still work
within it.   Most current intellectual leaders of the modern libertarian movement4
originated in the Rothbardian camp in one way or another.
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This story is worth retelling because it helps explain a feature of modern
libertarianism that has been on the wane for some time as Rothbard’s influence
declined during his lifetime and after his death: the radical disjuncture between
rights and consequences.   In the Rothbardian approach, rights were to be
defended on purely “moral” grounds—employing a Randian form of
Aristotelianism.   That a respect for properly defined moral rights yielded5
superior social consequences was treated like a happy coincidence, though one
that was quickly emphasized in nearly every discussion of libertarian public
policy.  Any “utilitarian” thinker, such as Friedman or Hayek, no matter how
libertarian his conclusions, was to be treated with skepticism.  Friedman and
Hayek’s own policy compromises with statism evidenced how utilitarians were
not to be trusted as true libertarians.  
But even before his death in 1995, Rothbard’s insistence on complete
agreement from his admirers, and his willingness to shuck any deviationists,
worked to undermine the radical disjunction between his approach and that of the
consequentialists.  One by one, his most brilliant adherents left the fold, either
voluntarily or by expulsion, and upon doing so, rediscovered the relationship
between rights and consequences long known to classical natural rights thinkers;
thinkers who predated the modern philosophical divide between Kantian
moralists on the one hand and Benthamite utilitarians on the other.  Before long,
former Rothbardian incorporated into their methods the insights of Hayek and
developed an appreciation for the libertarian commitment of Friedman as well;
though admittedly both men became much more radically libertarian as they aged
and therefore easier for radical libertarians to embrace.
Perhaps the person most responsible for moving to a new synthesis of
Rothbardian radical libertarianism with consequentialism was a former fair-haired
Rothbardian named George H. Smith.  While Smith authored few works in
political theory—his most influential publications concerned atheism, another
aspect of Rothbardian thought about which agreement was not demanded —in a6
few essays and many lectures and other oral presentations, he reconnected
modern libertarianism with its classical liberal roots.  After immersing himself in
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the writings of classical natural rights theorists, Smith developed and conveyed to
others through his lectures, a renewed appreciation for the classical liberal
reconciliation of natural rights with that of consequentialism.  
Whether or not due to Smith’s influence, libertarians no longer argue, as
they once did in the 1970's, about whether libertarianism must be grounded on
moral rights or on consequences.  Libertarians no longer act as though they must
choose between these two moral views and in this chapter I explain why they
need not.
TRANSCENDING RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENCES
Libertarians need not choose between moral rights and consequences
because theirs is a political, not a moral, philosophy; one that can be shown to be
compatible with various moral theories, which as we shall see is one source of its
appeal.  Moral theories based on either moral rights or on consequentialism
purport to be  “comprehensive,” insofar as they apply to all moral questions to the
exclusion of all other moral theories.  Although the acceptance of one of these
moral theories entails the rejection of all others, libertarian moral rights
philosophers such as Eric Mack, Loren Lomasky, Douglas Rasmussen and
Douglas Den Uyl on the one hand, and utilitarians such as Jan Narveson on the
other, can embrace libertarian political theory with equal fervor.  How can this
be?
As George Smith rediscovered, before Bentham and Kant, classical
natural rights “liberals” employed a mixture of moral rights and consequentialist
arguments in defense of the political protection of certain natural rights.  Within
modern libertarian political theory, moral rights and consequentialism can each be
viewed as a method of analyzing how humans ought to behave.  Because the use
of any method of analysis, including the application of moral theories, is fallible,
political theorists should be sensitive both to where moral rights and
consequentialist analysis reach the same results and to where they differ. 
First, if both methods tend to reach the same results in entirely different
ways, then each method can provide an analytic check on the other.  Because any
of our analytic methods may err or may be used to deceive, we can use one
method to confirm the results that appear to be supported by the other.
Analogously, after adding a column of figures from top to bottom, we sometimes
double check the sum by adding the figures again from bottom to top or by using
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a calculator.  Just as we rely upon institutional rivalries between branches of
government to protect against error and deception, we may rely upon “conceptual
rivalries” between different methods of normative inquiry for the same reason.
One way that moral rights and consequentialist modes of analysis may be
functionally compatible within a political theory is by providing a conceptual
“checks and balances” mechanism by which errors in our normative analysis may
be detected and prevented.
Second, only if we rely upon multiple modes of analysis can we assess the
degree of confidence we should have in a conclusion recommended by any single
mode of analysis.  Since no evaluative method is infallible, the more valid
methods that point in the same direction, the more confident we may be that this
is the direction in which to move.  Conversely, a divergence of results between
two valid methods suggests problems that may exist at the level of application of
a method or deep inside the method itself.  Divergent results from competing
methodologies recommend not only that we proceed cautiously, but also that we
carefully reconsider our methods and their application to discover, if possible, the
source of the divergence.  A second way, then, that an analysis of both moral
rights and consequences may be functionally compatible is that, when we rely on
competing modes of analysis, convergence of results begets confidence and
divergence of results stimulates discovery.   This is especially true when multiple7
methods each capture some feature of the world that most everyone thinks is
salient.
THE SALIENCE OF MORAL RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENTIALIST ANALYSES
A moral rights analysis, by which I mean rights derived either from
teleological or deontological methods, is salient because it takes seriously the
individual.  Properly defined moral rights protect the highly valued “private”
sphere.  Put another way, moral rights analysis views the actions of individuals
(and associations to which they consensually belong) from the perspective of the
individual.  The specialized evaluative techniques it employs are conducive to
elaborating this individualist perspective.  Because we all are individuals, the idea
of moral rights has wide appeal.  We have a natural interest in the protection of
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our rights, and our empathy causes us to be concerned about the protection of the
rights of others.
In contrast, consequentialist analysis is salient because it takes seriously
the wide-reaching and highly dispersed effect that the actions of individuals and
their associations may often have on others.  Consequentialist analysis can be
seen as protecting a “public” sphere.  Although consequentialist analysis is often
couched in terms of how “society” views the consequences of individual actions,
this anthropomorphic metaphor can be avoided by saying that consequentialist
analysis views the actions of individuals from the perspective of the other persons
with whom they live in society.  Because we are all affected by the actions of
others, the consequentialist perspective also has wide appeal.  We are concerned
about the consequences to us of other people’s actions and our empathy causes us
also to be concerned about the consequences of such actions for others.
In other words, both moral rights and consequentialism are not only
foundational moral theories, they are also useful heuristics—ways of thinking and
solving problems, quickly, efficiently, and maximizing what we already know—
within a political theory.  Even so, at some point, however, both of these
perspectives lose their salience.  Moral rights analysis becomes unappealing when
it advocates the protection of moral rights “though heavens may fall.”  Most
people care about the domain of discretionary actions that rights protect, but also
would care about the falling of the heavens.  Consequentialist analysis becomes
unappealing when it sacrifices the domain of action protected by moral rights in
the interest of a completely impersonal standard of value—utils, wealth
maximization, etc.  Most people do not want to sacrifice their liberty to act even if
such sacrifices would significantly benefit others.
The creative tension between moral rights and consequentialist analysis
reflects a tension that is central to the classical liberal core of the modern
libertarian project.  On the one hand, in contrast with more elitist approaches,
liberalism sought to protect the dignity of the common person, meaning all
persons qua human beings. On the other hand, liberalism always acknowledged
the need to prevent the actions of some from adversely affecting the interests of
others.  Nor did individualist-flavored liberalism ever deny the importance of the
communities in which individuals reside.  Liberalism always lay betwixt and
between these two great concerns, a position that has led some critics of
liberalism to complain of its internal dialectic, inherent tensions, or fundamental
contradictions.  
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It would be mistaken to conclude that this undeniable tension between
individual and community, between self and others, is a contradiction in a logical
sense.  Aristotle, no stranger to logic (albeit Aristotelian), held that virtue
consisted in seeking the mean between extremes.  Far from representing a middle-
of-the-road position, liberalism, like Aristotelian virtue ethics, attempts to supply
a conceptual and institutional structure that is exquisitely poised between the
individual and others.
Those types of political actions that pass muster from the points of view of
both moral rights and consequences—or neither—are “easy cases” in which we
can be quite confident in our judgment.  The types of political actions about
which moral rights and expediency provide conflicting assessments are “hard
cases” that call upon us to reconsider our analysis or further refine our analytic
techniques.  Until such time as a conflict between modes of analysis is resolved,
we must tread cautiously, and the fact that caution is required is itself worth
knowing. 
Still, the fact that we must act politically in the face of conflicting modes
of analysis or heuristics suggests that the “compatibilist” picture I have painted to
this point is incomplete.  How is it that we are not frozen in our tracks until
conflicts between moral rights and consequentialist perspectives are resolved?
There is yet another mechanism of choice that functions alongside analyses of
rights and consequences and this mechanism is not fully appreciated by many
libertarians, whether Rothbardians or utilitarians like Friedman, but is revealed by
a more Hayekian evolutionary approach.
THE MISSING LINK: LEGAL EVOLUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
The rhetoric of philosophers and economists would lead one to think that a
comprehensive analysis of moral rights or a comprehensive analysis of
consequences was capable of discovering the full panoply of norms upon which
law should be based.  But neither mode of analysis can accomplish such a feat.
Instead, both rights theorists and consequentialists get their starting points from
conventional practice.  In the Anglo-American legal systems, the spontaneously
evolving process known as the common law has typically generated the
conventions of practice.  As Lon Fuller put it:
It can be said that law is the oldest and richest of the social sciences. . . .
Economists who have exhausted the resources of their own science turn to the
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law for insight into the nature of the institutional arrangements essential for a
free economy.  Philosophers find in the law a discipline lacking in their own
sometimes errant studies—the discipline, namely, that comes of accepting the
responsibility for rendering decisions by which men can shape their lives.
8
That philosophical and economic analyses are typically used to subject
established conventional legal principles to critical scrutiny is of methodological
significance. It suggests that, even taken together, moral rights and
consequentialist analyses cannot explain the discovery of legal norms that would
satisfy their critical demands.  It suggests that moral rights and consequentialist
analyses are just a part of how legal norms are discovered.  Something more is
required.
While this is not how philosophers and economists usually view their own
disciplines, moral rights and consequentialism can be viewed as highly useful
ways of evaluating the inherited, traditional, or received wisdom.  Judges must
decide cases even in the absence of an iron-clad moral rights or consequentialist
analysis.  Indeed, for most of our legal history there was little such systematic
rational analysis available at all.  Yet somehow common-law processes managed
to develop doctrines that pass muster by moral rights and consequentialist
standards.  What made this possible?
Unlike either modern philosophy or economics, legal decision-making is
casuistic.   The need to resolve a multitude of real disputes or cases, each with its9
own peculiar facts, is the engine that drives legal evolution forward.  This engine
produces a body of reported outcomes of countless cases in which contending
parties have both laid claims of right to some resource (including the resource that
would be used to satisfy a monetary damage award) and the reasons given by
judges for these outcomes (as well as dissenting and concurring judicial
opinions). From this diverse body of outcomes and reasons evaluating claims of
right emerge dominant conventions—sometimes called the “majority rule”—and
other rival conventions that may be called the “minority rule.” 
Once discovered by legal institutions, these evolved conventional rules
governing rights claims may then be subjected to critical reason in the form of a
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mixture of moral rights and consequentialist analysis. Yet, for the traditional
conventions produced by the adjudicative process to provide more than a random
starting point for a critical analysis based on moral rights and consequences, it is
not enough that cases just be resolved.  The way disputed claims of right are
resolved determines whether the results reached by a legal system can evolve into
promising conventional standards of right conduct that can then be subjected to
and, in the main, survive the normative scrutiny of critical reason based on moral
rights and consequentialist analysis. Only if the processes that resolve disputes do
so in certain ways can we take the views we receive from these processes as a
form of wisdom.  Similarly, the way that legislation is enacted either supports or
undermines the likelihood that such legislation is substantively legitimate.  
The form that enables dispute resolution processes to produce
“judgments” that are knowledgeable enough to usually withstand critical scrutiny
on the basis of moral rights or consequences can be summarized under the rubric,
“the rule of law.”  I discuss elsewhere at some length the procedural elements that
help assure decisions that will pass the scrutiny of rights and consequentialist
analysis.   Lon Fuller provided the best summary of these formal constraints,10 11
which he called the “internal morality of law.”
What I have called the internal morality of law is in this sense a procedural
version of natural law, though to avoid misunderstanding the word “procedural”
should be assigned a special and expanded sense so that it would include, for
example, a substantive accord between official action and enacted law.  The
term “procedural” is, however, broadly appropriate as indicating that we are
concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in
which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and
administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain what it
purports to be.
12
Decisions made according to the formal standards provided by the rule of
law are capable of producing an elaborate set of decisions consisting of  results
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(the facts of the case plus who won) and the articulated rationales for the results.
When a sufficiently elaborate set of decisions (results and rationales) has
developed, it becomes possible to subject this set of practices to systematic
rational appraisal—including the appraisal provided by what Fuller termed the
“external morality of law.”13
Some might respond that, if moral rights and consequentialist modes of
analysis are both useful ways of improving upon past practices that have evolved
as part of a process governed by the rule of law, what then is the criterion or
criteria by which we decide that something is or is not an “improvement”?
Unless we know the standard by which improvement is to be measured, how can
we say that either method improves upon current practices?  Unless we know the
ends of the legal system, how can we know they are being served?  To answer the
question of ends, goes this response, requires a choice between the normative
standard of justice based on moral rights or the normative standard of utility
based on the maximization of beneficial consequences.  In making this choice we
cannot escape the essential incompatibility of rights and consequences as moral
theories.  Ultimately, one approach must either be subordinate to or subsume the
other.
             Although some idea of “improvement” is indeed needed to appreciate the
roles played by moral rights, consequential analysis, and the rule of law, this
conception of improvement need not be based exclusively on any one of these
three perspectives.  Rather than comprehensive evaluative theories, all three
approaches can be recast as problem-solving devices.  Viewed in this light, all of
these modes of analysis are themselves means, not ends.  To provide the requisite
idea of improvement, one must identify, not so much an ultimate standard of
value, but the ultimate problem that we need legal coercion to solve.  We can then
see how an evolutionary common-law decision-making process and modes of
critical analysis, such as those provided by moral rights and consequentialist
methods, all contribute to solving the relevant problem.  Moreover, other
processes and methods of rational analysis, such as rational bargaining analysis or
game theory, may be useful as well.
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THE ENDS OF JUSTICE: PROVIDING THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL ORDER
According to classical liberals, the fundamental problem facing every
society may be summarized as follows: Given that the actions of each person in
society are likely to have effects on others, on what conditions is it possible for
persons to live and pursue happiness in society with other persons?  “Social
order” is the term that has traditionally been used to describe the state of affairs
that permits every person to live and pursue happiness in society with others.
F.A. Hayek offered the following definition of the general concept of “order”: 
[A] state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so
related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial
or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or
at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.
14
Unfortunately, this term has come to be associated with ordering schemes
imposed from above by totalitarian regimes.  As Hayek noted, “[t]he term ‘order’
has, of course, a long history in the social sciences, . . . but in recent times it has
generally been avoided, largely because of the ambiguity of its meaning and its
frequent association with authoritarian views. We cannot do without it, however .
. . .”   For this reason, perhaps the term “coordination” better captures the15
problem of achieving what Hayek called an “order of actions.”   Whatever the16
terminology, some way must be found to permit persons to act so that their
actions do not obstruct the actions of others.
This rendition of the fundamental problem of human society contains a
number of classical liberal or libertarian presuppositions.  While I view
libertarianism as a subset of classical liberalism, on these five points all or most
classical liberals agree. First, libertarians recognize the existence and value of
individual persons. Second, libertarians place value on the ability of all persons to
live and pursue happiness.  Third, libertarians use the phrase “pursuit of
happiness” because they reject the idea that one particular style of life is to be
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preferred above all others for everyone.  Fourth, libertarians recognize that people
live in society with others and that the actions of one may have both positive and
negative affects on others. Fifth, libertarians maintain that it is possible to find
conditions or ground rules that would provide all or nearly all persons living in
society the opportunity to pursue happiness without depriving others of the same
opportunity.
Of course, although they are widely shared, each of these presuppositions
is and has always been controversial.  For this reason, classical liberalism is and
has always been controversial, as libertarianism is today. Where controversy
arises over any of these presuppositions, it must be thrashed out in the appropriate
forum.  Given these presuppositions, however, the next step is to ask how it is that
the problem of achieving coordination is actually to be solved.  In the next
section, I suggest how  “natural rights” address this problem.
THE IMPERATIVE OF CERTAIN NATURAL RIGHTS
The term “natural rights” means many things to many people, and I shall
not try to compare my conception with that of others.  For present purposes it is
enough to identify two significant features of natural rights thinking.  First,
writers in the classical natural rights tradition were attempting to address in a
realistic manner the problem of social order.  Sometimes they referred to this as
the “common good,” referring not to some public good that transcends the
persons living in society with others, but to those basic requirements that all such
persons share in common.  Second, they addressed this problem with a mixture of
what we would today consider moral rights and consequentialist analyses, from
which they concluded that laws and 
political systems should be assessed against certain principles they described as
natural rights.
Let me summarize briefly the liberal approach to natural rights that I have
identified and defended at length elsewhere.   When living in society with others,17
humans need to act. Their actions will require the use of physical resources,
including their bodies but, because of scarcity, their actions will unavoidably
affect others.  Given that nearly all human action will affect others in some way,
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how are actions to be regulated so as to permit individuals to act in pursuit of
happiness without impeding the similar pursuit by others?  
To answer this, a natural rights approach attempts to establish an
appropriate time and place for the actions of different persons by examining
certain features of the world that are common to all, at least under circumstances
we would consider to be normal.  Abstracting from normal circumstances gives
rise to comparatively abstract principles that presumptively govern the use of
resources unless it can be shown that extraordinary circumstances exist to support
the creation of an exception—itself defeasible—to the rule.   The contours of this18
scheme of defeasible principles and exceptions define in general terms the natural
rights of all persons—rights that are not themselves individually defeasible.  
The basic rights produced at this stage are quite abstract. For persons to
live and pursue happiness in society with others, persons need to act at their own
discretion. This is made possible by recognizing a sphere of jurisdiction over
physical resources—including their own bodies—that provides them with
discretionary control—or “liberty”—over these resources.  Put another way,
persons need to be at liberty to act freely within the realm of their jurisdictions
and these jurisdictions have both temporal and spatial boundaries.
The term for this bounded jurisdiction is the “right of property,”  with19
property given its older meaning of “proprietorship.”  One was said to have
property in an object or in one’s body.   Property, in this sense, refers not to an20
object, but to a right to control physical resources—a right that cannot normally
be displaced without either the consent or wrongful conduct of the right holder.
Some of these property rights are alienable and others are inalienable.  Persons
need to be able to consensually transfer their alienable rights or jurisdiction to
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others. The term for this is the “right of freedom of contract.”   In addition,21
persons need to bring previously owned physical resources into a state of
proprietorship (the “right of first possession”), to use force to defend their rights
(the “right of self-defense”), and to receive compensation for any interferences
with the use and enjoyment of the resources which they own (the “right of
restitution”).  In addition, some libertarians think there is also a natural “right to
punish” rights violators.
These are the fundamental inalienable rights of classical liberalism that lie
at the very core of libertarianism: the rights of Several Property, Freedom of
Contract, First Possession, Self-Defense, and Restitution.  In the abstract, all these
rights are inalienable: persons always retain the right to perform the types of acts
that these rights sanction.  However, while the right to one’s person is inalienable,
particular physical items that are brought into a state of ownership may be
alienated by consent.  And even an inalienable right may be forfeited by
wrongdoing.  
Abstract natural rights are like a “cheat sheet” for a multiple choice exam.
They can often distinguish right action from wrong, but they do not provide all
the reasons why some actions should be thought right and others wrong, and
therefore they are often unpersuasive unless bolstered by more explicitly
consequentialist analysis.  Nonetheless, such a cheat sheet can obviate the need
for costly and potentially tragic “social experiments” that may be recommended
by faulty consequentialist analyses.   Even when such experiments are22
destructive, there is often no efficient way to terminate them.  Perhaps more than
others, libertarians contend that it is far better to use an abstract natural rights
analysis to look before one leaps.  But if seriously adverse consequences were
ever shown to result from adhering to the outcomes recommended by a natural
rights analysis, that analysis would have to be reexamined and perhaps revised.
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Lastly, to perform their function of enabling social order, however, natural
rights—which are nothing more than concepts or constructs—must be
implemented by effective institutions that enable them to be protected and
enforced.  These institutions must themselves be subject to substantive and
procedural “constitutional” constraints to ensure that the institutions whose
mission it is to protect rights do not end up violating them.23
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
Natural rights allow persons and associations the jurisdiction to decide
how certain physical resources—including their own bodies—should be used.
Such jurisdiction is bounded, and institutions governed by the rule of law must
enforce the boundaries.  These institutions, in turn, produce the cases and
decisions that lead to important refinements of our understanding of the basic
precepts of justice.  Legal evolution requires a constant rotation among these
modes of analysis—the rule of law and justice based on both moral rights and
consequentialist analyses—and others as well.  Viewed in static terms, this
process may appear circular.  Viewed as an evolutionary process, it more nearly
resembles a propeller, whose rotation enables a ship to move forward in the
water.
           Determining the content of the rights that define justice does not, however,
exhaust the whole issue of how persons ought to behave.  While natural rights
purport to be universal, based as they are in abstractions that apply in all places
and at all times, these rights are not comprehensive.  Identifying the bounded
rights people have to control physical resources does not specify how people
should exercise their rights.  For example, should one be an egoist exercising
one’s rights solely to benefit oneself, an altruist exercising one’s rights solely to
benefit others, or somewhere in between?
Natural rights theorists sometimes distinguished between “perfect” and
“imperfect” rights and duties. Perfect rights referred to those rights that create an
enforceable duty in others, as in “I have a perfect right to this land.”  Imperfect
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rights identify duties towards oneself and others that do not justify the use of
coercion.  The natural rights analysis described above addresses only the question
of enforceability.  The question of unenforceable individual duties must be
addressed by the broader inquiry known as natural law ethics.   Lon Fuller made24
a similar distinction between the “morality of aspiration” (what I am calling “the
good,” which is addressed by natural law ethics) and the “morality of duty” (what
I am calling “justice,” which is addressed by natural rights):
The morality of aspiration ... is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of
the fullest realization of human powers. . . . Where the morality of aspiration
starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom.
It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or
without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail
of its mark. . . . It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for
the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to
respect the basic requirements of social living.
25
Much needless controversy about natural rights is generated by the idea
that an adequate rights theory must address not only the problem of unjust
conduct that justifies legal enforcement, but also the problem of good, virtuous, or
ethical conduct.  The general issue of good conduct far exceeds the domain of
natural rights, with one significant exception.  Although a natural rights analysis
seeks to permit the pursuit of differing conceptions of the good life, it does
prevent, at least indirectly, certain conceptions of the good from being achieved.
In this sense, though a natural rights approach is universal with respect to just
conduct, but not comprehensive with respect to good conduct, it still excludes
some conceptions of the good.  It is particularly incompatible with any
comprehensive theory of the good that requires overriding the requirements of
justice defined by natural rights.
A natural rights approach solves the problem of social order by placing
certain restrictions on the means one may use to pursue happiness.  Consequently
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and unavoidably, those who believe that their pursuit of happiness requires them
to use the very means that are proscribed cannot be permitted to do so.  For
example, those who find their gratification in having intercourse with others
against their will may not pursue this course of action because this pursuit runs
afoul of the principles of justice that make human life in society possible.  Of
course, such conduct is not only unjust, it is also ethically despicable.  That an
action is ethically despicable, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient to
justify its legal prohibition.
In addition to restricting “bad” conduct that is also unjust, a natural rights
approach sometimes prohibits coercively mandating “good” conduct.  Earlier I
described the legal enterprise—with its rivalrous components of the rule of law
and natural rights based on both a moral rights and consequentialist analysis—as
the means by which we solve the problem of social order.  But social order is not
the only problem facing persons living in society with others.  What about the
provision of food, water, shelter, and other material, not to mention spiritual,
needs of life?  Does not the legal enterprise have an important role to play in the
provision or at least the distribution of all these goods as well?
Although I address this question at greater length elsewhere,  some basic26
methodological observations can be made here. First, one ought not use the
mechanisms that enable social order to exist to address other pressing problems if
doing so seriously undermines the ability of these mechanisms to continue to
address the problem of social order.  The attainment of social order is a
prerequisite to effectively addressing the other problems of social life.  A society
in complete or near chaos cannot address any social problem effectively, however
serious that problem may be. This is like stealing from a building’s foundation to
add more floors to the top.  A very well-designed building can tolerate a bit of
this type of activity without collapsing, but a policy of taking from the foundation
to build a higher building increases the risk of collapse from the very first taking
and ensures that a catastrophe will occur at some point if it is continued.
Second, if establishing and preserving social order actually prevented the
effective pursuit of these other vital goals, we would seriously question the
priority we place on social order.  To the contrary, however, the achievement of
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social order based on libertarian precepts of justice and the rule of law makes it
possible for other institutions to pursue other goals without violating the
constraints imposed by these precepts of justice.  Indeed, a consequentialist
analysis would reveal such institutions to be far more capable of addressing these
problems than any known alternative, especially institutions that override natural
rights. 
The natural rights method I have described with its consequentialist
component allows the theoretical possibility that, in extreme and abnormal
instances, exceptions are justified.  I am skeptical that any exception to the regime
of justice and the rule of law is necessary or prudent, but on this issue reasonable
people in the classical liberal tradition have and will continue to differ.  Indeed,
libertarians can be distinguished from their classical liberals fellow-travelers by
their deep skepticism about making exceptions.  While I believe this skepticism
of libertarians is warranted, it is based as much on past experience with the
consequences of recognizing exceptions—especially the inability to confine
exceptions to the exceptional—as it is on any first principles about natural rights,
each of which already have various exceptions built in.
Finally, while a commitment to moral “neutrality” per se is not a tenet of
libertarianism, a libertarian natural rights approach is operationally neutral among
the many alternative ways to pursue happiness that are consistent with the basic
requirements of social order.  Because libertarianism prohibits conduct that
violates natural rights, it will unavoidably, but only incidentally, prohibit some
actions that are individually bad and bar the use of force to require some acts that
may well be good.  Persons who wish to pursue happiness by violating the rights
of others may be condemned for acting badly or immorally (that is, contrary to
the good), but they may be forcibly coerced only because they are acting unjustly
(that is, contrary to natural rights).  Persons who wish to see their comprehensive
moral vision implemented may do so, but only by “just” means that do not violate
the side constraints on action identified by libertarian natural rights.
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CONCLUSION: HOW LIBERTARIANISM DIFFERS FROM CONSERVATISM
In contrast with the moralism of traditional conservative or
neoconservative approaches, libertarians often sound legalistic.  The analysis
presented here helps explain why.  While neither denying morality nor adopting a
relativist moral stance, Libertarian political theory transcends different conflicting
approaches to morality.  Unlike moral or religious theorists, a libertarian, qua
libertarian, is not seeking a universal and comprehensive answer to the question
of how persons ought to behave.  Rather a libertarian seeks a universal answer to
the question of when the use of force is justified.  A libertarian, qua libertarian,
does not deny that a more ambitious morality exists; they merely deny the
political claim that immorality, standing alone, is an adequate justification for the
use of force by one person against another.  In contrast, many conservatives
assume, usually implicitly, that force is justified whenever human conduct is
found to be bad or immoral.  Libertarianism is much more modest, but for good
reason.  Libertarians seek a political theory that could be accepted by persons of
diverse approaches to morality living together and interacting in what Hayek
called the Great Society.
Any political theory that would enforce all moral norms would
immediately confront radically different views of morality held by others in the
same civil society.  Enforcing morality would require the attainment of political
power by those with one moral approach and the forcible suppression of any who
disagree.  Naturally, many of those who dissent will resist.  In this way, a war of
all against all is likely to result as each proponent of a comprehensive moral view
seeks to attain a coercive monopoly of power over others and avoid others
attaining a monopoly of power over them.  The situation is exacerbated when the
source of morality comes from a religious faith, which is not shared by all, rather
than from reason.  
A libertarian natural rights approach seeks, and largely succeeds in
identifying, a law that is common to all: prohibiting murder, rape, theft, etc.
Whatever their moral differences, few purveyors of a comprehensive moral
vision, whether religiously based or not, or even most criminals for that matter,
disagree about the injustice of these types of acts.  They simply grant themselves
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an exemption from these principles when pursuing higher moral or religious ends,
or, in the case of criminals, base immoral ends.
What conservatives, neoconservatives, and those on the left seeking to
impose by force their conception of the good neglect is what I have called “the
problem of power”—an exacerbated instance of the twin fundamental social
problems of knowledge and interest.   Here is the problem.  Once the use of27
power is legitimated on any ground, its use must somehow be limited to this
ground and not be extended beyond.  Using power raises the cost of erroneous
judgment by imposing greater burdens on those who are mistakenly victimized;
and, once created, the instruments of power can be captured to serve the interests
of those who wield it, rather than the ends of justice.  And, as we have just seen,
once the use of force is accepted as a legitimate means for imposing on dissenters
a comprehensive morality, then each group has the incentive to capture the
institutions employing powers of coercion to wield these institutions against those
who hold different moral views and to avoid these institutions being captured and
used by others against them.
For all these reasons libertarians contend that we must place conceptual
and institutional limits or constraints on the exercise of power, including the
power to do good or to demand moral or virtuous conduct.  For a comprehensive
moralist of the right or left, using force to impose their morality on others might
be their first choice among social arrangements.  Having another’s comprehensive
morality imposed upon them by force is their last choice.  The libertarian
minimalist approach of enforcing only the natural rights that define justice should
be everyone’s second choice.  A compromise, as it were, that makes civil society
possible.   And therein lies its imperative.
